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Abstract: To what extent are we witnessing real transformatory change towards a low- or
zero-carbon economy following the optimism surrounding the COP21 Paris agreements? Taking the
energy/agri-food nexus as a major focus, the paper examines what it regards as highly contested
co-evolutionary trends associated both with carbonised and geo-politically motivated ‘lock-in’ on
the one hand, but nevertheless, the rise of significant post-carbon strategies and practices on the
other. The latter may be significantly encouraged by the rise of what are termed as ‘stranded assets’
and disinvestments in the financial investment sector, and the opportunities for more distributed
systems of production in the energy/agri-food nexus. These shifts suggest a more polyvalent set of
post-carbonised capitalist and post-capitalist processes which demand a renewed political- ecological
approach by scholars in understanding these multiple resources and transformatory processes.
Overall, this would suggest that the transformations before us will not assume a ‘business as usual’
model of conventional (and concentrated) capitalist development.
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1. Introduction: The Unfolding Carbon-Based Crisis and the Rise of ‘Stranded Assets’:
Pre-Cursors to Sustainable Transformations in the Energy/Agri-Food Nexus?
The 2007–2008 financial crisis and its continuing effects strengthen the need to critically explore
the pathways of transformation towards sustainability and sustainable development. At the same
time, as Marsden [1] argues, the signature crisis, which in fact was a ‘combined retrenchment of
the food, fuel, finance and fiscal crisis’, also questioned the ability of the sustainability concept
to address it, let alone resolve it. Since then, the concept has been contested in theory, as well
as appropriated in practice. Therefore, today we are at what seems to be the crossroads of these
debates. First, we see alternative and transformational theoretical “roads”, namely eco-economic and
bioeconomy approaches, and the practical “roads” between eco and bio-economies. However, after
a decade of capital and state crisis, this crossroads is ever more contested, connected, intertwined
and path-dependent, thus potentially giving way to both transformational change on the one hand,
although with serious carbon-based ‘lock in’ tendencies on the other. In this paper, we explore this
crossroads and a possible ‘tragedy of the horizons’ [2], as it offers an opportunity to re-conceptualise,
strengthen and re-ground our understanding of potential transformation, especially in the critical
nexus of energy and agri-food arena.
In 1992, the International Conference of Parties on Climate Change took place, marking the
recognition that global natures are being affected and need to be protected, for human and non-human
species survival, rather than being continually exploited. However, this would involve a step back
from practices that have arguably benefited humans for the last two centuries in doing so, requiring
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Heads of States to implement changes. Since then, there has been significant progress in technology,
adoption of new practices, reductions of pollution, but there is still a long way to go to achieve a
transition to a post-carbon emission world, despite the urgency. This progress has been stalled due to
many factors, but in this paper, we want to emphasise the economic Janus-faced interest in climate
change negotiations. To put it in simple terms, cutting emissions, the closing down of coal power
plants, and switching to renewables leads to losses of short-term profits without which an investment
in green energy might be challenging. The most developed or fastest growing countries still owe
their financial progress (as well as regress) to polluting industries and the wealth generated through
market forces.
Despite a growing understanding and agreement on anthropocentric causes of global climate
change and resource depletion, the tensions between the progress towards a low or zero-carbon
world versus the business-as-usual economic development model have been evident in a lack of
firm agreement in climate negotiations between Heads of States. Only in December 2015, during the
21st Conference of Parties (known as COP21), was an agreement reached between many of the top
national polluters signaling that “business as usual” cannot continue. COP21 is a significant step
regarding bringing forth a more precise, long-term signal and direction to Heads of States spelt out in
5 provisions: five year plans and reporting; adaptation; loss and damage; finance; transparency; and
capacity building. On 22 of April, 2016, 175 parties (174 countries and the European Union) signed the
Paris Agreement. The agreement entered into force on 4 November 2016, thirty days after the date on
which at least 55 Parties to the Convention, accounting in total for at least an estimated 55 % of the
total global greenhouse gas emissions, signed it [3].
While the Paris Agreement is being actioned, the emerging literature [4–6] highlights the concept
of ‘stranded assets’—a possible effect of regime shift from oil to renewables. Stranded assets emerge as a
result of new technologies being implemented which then cause a devaluation of existing carbon-based
assets which were once dominant. The regime shift toward a post-Paris 2015 “world” might mean
that owners and traders of hydrocarbon assets (conventional and unconventional oil, gas, and coal)
begin to devalue or experience a devaluation of their assets. ‘Stranding’ of assets is predicted to
be acute, because of circulation of hydrocarbon assets in the world economy, which when at risk
impacts upon rural and urban places, political decisions, government spending and all productive
industries depending on oil, such as the food sector and especially meat production. However, not
only is the concept being contested [7], it is almost invisible in the current sustainability research and
literature. We aim to highlight the potency of this concept in material terms (risks and impacts) and in
strengthening multidisciplinary research and furthering critical thinking about sustainability.
Research Methods and Design.
This paper outlines post-Paris 2015-18 events and focuses on the concept of stranded assets and
the emerging contested dynamics in the agri-food-energy nexus. Considering the fast-changing nature
of the post-Paris 2015 “world”, we draw our arguments from systematic reviews of academic, trade
literature and news media conducted between 2015 and 2018.The evidence and events described in
this paper come from the trade publications and major news outlets with a focus on changes with
regard to energy as a result of COP21. Considering that the paper is only attempting to “make sense
of” the fast-changing world of finance and politics, we have deliberately resisted using pre-defined
frames of analysis. Instead, we aimed to paint the picture. However, as the news was unfolding over
the years, we noted the complex co-evolutionary shifts in the policy of both countries and companies.
The paper pursues the following structure, which traces and explores this process of competitive
co-evolution. First, and arising from our systematic reviews of literatures, trade and media reports in
the field, we assemble a schematised conceptual model which explores the juxtapositioning of these
trends and contestations (Section 2). This raises new questions concerning what the potential for new
options and spatial re-configurations will be emerging as we move through this highly contested period
of transformation. Second, we examine the particular rise in carbonised ‘stranded assets’ as potential
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push factors for transformations and, indeed, reducing the ‘lock in’ and ‘spatial fixing’ tendencies in
carbonised systems of agri-food and energy production. Third, Sections 4 and 5 lead itno an analysis
of the dialectics between carbonised and post-carbonised geo-politics and political ecologies. This
demands, it is argued, that more needs to be done to shift investments into renewables (Section 6), and
that the global financial sector is a critical bellwether in this regard. Finally, in conclusion (Section 7)
we critically consider and posit the possibilities for a more distributed agri-food/energy nexus in this
contested landscape, suggesting that this nexus approach coupled with a critical political-ecological
perspective is of significant value in further charting and indeed mobilising the transformations in the
enery/agri-food/energy nexus, and in generating the institutional capacities for this to become far
more embedded.
2. A Conceptual Model: The Dialectical Relationships between Carbon-Based ‘Lock-In’ and New
Drivers and Spatial Re-Configurations
Some of the major changes which we will delineate in this discussion are identified in
summary form in Box 1. This attempts to summarise some of the current key dynamics
regarding the agri-food/energy nexus. The dynamics presented in Box 1 add to the persistent
and new uncertain-by-nature challenges within agri-food sectors across the globe, as set out by
Thompson et al. [8] over 10 years ago.
This extends Marsden’s earlier arguments on the importance of the four pillars of sustainability:
‘place, reflexivity, distributed eco-economy and re-financialisation’ [1,9]. We argue that transformations
towards sustainability in the energy/agri-food nexus need to be critically considered in the post-2007/8
political economic/ecological context of financial, fiscal, food and fuel crises that are both more
profound and more volatile. This is currently leading both to the re-enforcement of existing
conventional carbon regimes, as well as to significant and potentially transformative reactions to
them. In the midst of these different relations is a dynamic of financialisation, growing vulnerability
and common questions for more autonomous alternatives involving taking control of financing
and developing localised and distributed systems of food and energy provision. As we shall see,
this process of competitive co-evolution—that between carbonised and non-carbonised practices—is
nowhere more explicitly expressed than in the energy/agri-food nexus.
Box 1. Key nexus dynamics in energy and agri-food. Source: developed by the authors.
• Pressures on the dominant carbon—based regime.
• Intergovernmental pressure to reduce CO2 emissions/SDGs.
• More difficulty in sourcing carbon assets and the financing thereof.
• Overall financialisation of energy and food systems creating ‘lock-in effects’.
• More financial volatility and short-termism in investment.
• Rising household costs and costs of production for small suppliers.
• More intensive searches for ‘spatial fixes’ [9] in the form of ‘land-grabs’.
• Rise of renewable energy and food systems provision.
• Attraction of new investments (despite gov’t actions in many cases).
• Centralisation versus distributed debates about provision, control and democracy.
• The rise of the bio-economy and further growth in stranded carbon-based assets and investments.
• Agri-food system transformations follow energy transformations historically.
Following this, our conceptual model (see Figure 1) postulates the juxtaposition between the
‘lock-in’ (and spatial effects) associated with the continuing carbon-based model of development
explored in this paper and the emerging post-carbon developments. The argument is that both of
these conditions are currently continuing at the same time; and that this co-evolution is becoming
a macro-dialectic necessary for further conceptualisation and critical empirical interrogation. One
implication of such an approach is that for real transformations to occur in the energy/agri-food nexus,
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we need to assess how shifts occur both in the established lock-in effects and in the rise of post-carbon
alternatives. That is, across and within the boxes identified in Figure 1. We are witnessing changes in
the political ecologies of capital, state, science and civil society arena (i.e., on the vertical axis of our
Figure 1), which are challenging existing spatial and temporal fixes and configurations of conventional
and carbonised systems of resource exploitation and production (i.e., the dynamic components on
the horizontal axis). In particular, we document below how increasing investments are being made
in energy renewables and that we are also witnessing the rise in ‘stranded assets’ in carbon-based
financial markets.
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A McCarthy [10] rgues, ‘a transition to profoundly different geographies of energy production,
transmission and cons mption could affor powerful political possibilities’. Recent work has
suggested that energy production is, in various ways, becoming more spatially ext nsive, dispersed
nd visible, and hence mor conte t d and overtly politicised [11,12]. Key issues here are likely to
include ‘structures of ownership and control, the degree of centralisation, and the extent to which the
focus on bstract “ nergy” as oppos d t t e use v lues derived from energy use. In short, a thorough
overall of the energy system could and should provide multiple openings for re-thinking, rather than
merely reproducing, our political-economic system’ [10].
Clearly, these shifts have wider both direct and indirect implications for the energy-agri-food
nexus [1]. Frantal and Martinat argue that [13]:
‘Renewable energy sources are regarded as spatially dispersed and difficult to collect, thereby
requiring substantial land resources in comparison with conventional energy resources. Moreover,
they are mostly undertaken in rural areas hitherto unaffected by large-scale industrial development.
The problem of balancing the advantages and disadvantages, both real and perceived, of projects
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(taking into account such diverse considerations as, on the one hand, global climate issues, the energy
strategies of national governments, regional development policies, and local community benefits,
while also on the other hand stressing the significance of nature and landscape protection, calling for
a restoration of productive farming, and the preservation of local cultural identity) often provokes
political and social conflicts arising from differing values and conceptions of land-use’.
One spectre might be new spatial fixes of concentrated investment involving large-scale
geographies of renewable energy production, distribution and consumption, involving powerful
new rounds of investment in, and claims on rural areas for production and provision, on scales well
beyond existing rounds of speculative ‘land grabs’. ‘In a capitalist world, those claims and their
impacts would likely to fall disproportionately on rural areas, where land values are lowest and
existing users often have less power and fewer formal land rights’ [10]. In this context, rural land
and indeed its multi-functional biospheric resources could become a new battlefield for contested
control, as new capital and state interests attempt to appropriate and capture the rights to control
these renewable resources. This could lead to the accelerated further appropriation and enclosure of
biospheric and global resource ‘commons’.
This is McCarthy’s main question: will the rise of post-carbonised energy systems lead to a
renewed and more intensified ‘spatial fixing’ process in neo-liberalised but monopoly capitalism? We
wish to complement this concern here by additionally addressing the alternate question. Does the
rise of post-carbonism in the energy/agri-food nexus provide opportunities for the co-evolution of
alternative, more distributed and post-capitalist forms of sustainable production and consumption
to take hold? It is important, we can argue, not to see these two questions as starkly and mutually
opposing or in binary terms. Rather, they are both at the centre of a revised and critical political ecology
of sustainability [14,15].
It may be, as we at least begin to outline in this paper, with an examination of both models, that
both tendencies are in display over different time and space vectors. In Figure 2, we attempted to
conceptualise the emerging landscape of energy and food. In particular, we wanted to draw attention
to where within this landscape, characterised by distributed and centralised systems of governance,
some of the examples of food and energy production fall into. As we see and summarise in Figures 1
and 2 then, both the tendencies to continue to spatially fix both carbonised and renewable concentrated
capital and production continues, at the same time and through different spatial and temporal logics,
alternative and more distributed transformations are also indeed occurring.
A major question thus becomes: what will be the potential for new options and spatial
configurations emerging as we move through this highly contested period of transformation? Will
it lead to new rounds of centralised capitalist ‘lock-in’ and spatial fixes (see Figure 1), for instance,
appropriating even more global frontiers (like rural and ocean spaces)? Or will the political and social
implications of the process of transformation itself lead to civic and state-based interventions which
push for more decentred and distributed power and spatial reconfigurations?
In the agri-food sector and the agri-food/energy nexus, we are seeing, we argue here, the
beginnings and emergence of new power and spatial configurations, both in and through the rise
of micro and community energy schemes, and alternative food networks and assemblages (see
Figure 2). In the UK (2018), it is estimated that over a third of all farmers are, in addition to foods,
also producing some form of renewable energy in the form of solar, bio-gas, wind turbines and
local hydro capture [16,17]. This is not ‘business-as-usual- capitalism’, and it challenges both the
‘lock-in’ tendencies and spatial fixes associated with carbon-based agglomerative capitalism. Instead, it
creates new nested markets and re-localised production niches using distinctive and more distributed
organising principles. This is a new dynamic in post-carbon capitalism, and it is, as we shall explore in
the rest of this paper, affecting the energy/agri nexus. Clearly, at a generalised level, there are a series
of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors at work, and these will be explored in the following sections.
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3. The Rise of Stranded Assets: Financial Push Factors towards Transitions and Reducing
‘Lock-In’ Effects
As new technologies emerge, and new companies outcompete incumbents, a relentless process
of ‘creative destruction’ results in stranded assets [4]. To strand assets in financial terms means to
prematurely write off, devalue or convert them to liabilities. Assets can become stranded due to many
factors, from environmental protest and policy, through to social to regulatory change. However, due
to a connection of assets to a broader system (or a network) assets are not left out, abandoned or
cancelled out completely.
The concept of stranded assets is a contested one, as it assumes that sooner or later,
hydrocarbon assets will become ‘stranded’ because of pressure from civic society (divestment), physical
(un)availability of conventional and unconventional hydrocarbons, the emergence of alternative
technologies, and new state policy causing economic shifts (disinvestment). This means that they will
be prematurely written off or unwanted in financial terms, therefore affecting the economy, which
still rests on the performance of hydrocarbons in stock exchanges. A poor performance, as history
shows [18], means that investments, i.e., injection and circulation of capital (in whichever form) will be
held up, thus further impacting a financial system built on an assumption of continuous growth and
predictability of assets.
Currently, the most prominent rejection (or at least denial) of this concept comes from the
established oil and energy industry (and investors), who still argue that while societies support
sustainable pathways, they also need to exploit carbonised energy, which at the moment will not be
entirely replaced by renewables. The oil industry assumes that overall energy demands will not subside
anytime soon, thus investing can continue irrespective of policies. The industry also recognises that
governments, being reliant on oil tax revenues, might change or delay policy instruments such as heavy
taxing of the oil industry and tax breaks for renewables [7]. Thus, even though high-profile financiers,
for example, Mark Carney of Bank of England, are warning that stranded assets are becoming a
reality [2], the concept is continually denied and resisted. Indeed, there should be no denial on our
part that oil holds a strong bearing on the world economies. We also, do not deny that a rising and
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wealthier global population will need more energy. To accept that refined oil is a source of energy
and income, does not mean rejecting the stranded assets concept. Instead, we need to accept that
sustainable futures will have to reconcile the existence of oil and its impact, especially on political
decisions. Thus, stranded assets need to be seen in the context of:
a) The highs and peaks of hydrocarbons as a traded commodity;
b) The (un)availability of conventional and conventional hydrocarbons;
c) The physical impact of climate change—floods, droughts, fires, etc.;
d) Societal pressures and political instabilities.
The stranded assets concept extends beyond oil, as the process of prematurely writing assets off
be it financial or physical, is not bound to one industry. Industrialised carbonism has interconnected
industrial sectors, not least the agri-food and energy sectors. It thus needs to be emphasised that
agricultural and agri-food assets and processes, being linked to the oil industry and classed as a
high GHG emitter, can be equally vulnerable to stranding by the points mentioned above. Even
though agriculture is not targeted in formal COP21 negotiations, the parties to the Paris accord agreed
to ‘recognise the fundamental priority of safeguarding food security and ending hunger, and the
particular vulnerabilities of food production systems to the adverse impacts of climate change’ [19].
Article 2 of the accord writes:
‘This Agreement, in enhancing the implementation of the Convention, including its objective,
aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable
development and efforts to eradicate poverty, including by increasing the ability to adapt to the
adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions
development, in a manner that does not threaten food production’.
Article 2 has been criticised for not giving specific measures or attention to the agri-food sector.
Nevertheless, the meat industry, as the Global Meats reports suggests, is threatened by the above
accord [20], arguing that it cannot be treated like hydrocarbon industries. However, the multiplex
stranding process in the agri-food sector can occur irrespective of direct policy pressures. As a result
of climate change, climate change negotiations and instability of hydrocarbons the paradigm will
thus shift for the agri-food system too. The agri-food system will experience its direct pressures from
the environment as well as a local and global society. Exposure to assets that will become directly
or indirectly “stressed” will be highest where the value of such assets is high (e.g., environmental
pressure and vulnerability) and the vulnerability to drivers (physical or economic) is also high [5].
Stranding of assets under a direct or indirect paradigm shift is, therefore, a concept that cannot be
disregarded, as it is closely related and linked to more than one sector, concern and place. In addition,
in the agri-food sector, these re-financialised processes are beginning to act as essential drivers for
paradigm change towards more post-carbon agri-food/energy practices (among those we witness
around agro-ecological practices: the rise of place-based and more distributed markets, and consumer
as well as producer–led solidarity economies).
4. Climate Change Negotiations, Paris, 2015—A Paradigm Shifter.
The Conference of Parties (henceforth COP) started in 1995 with the aim of beginning
implementation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (also known as the
“Rio Conventions”). Since then, various efforts have been made to achieve reduction of unsustainable
practices at local, national and international levels. Consecutive COPs addressed carbon emissions
through a series of protocols and agreements, with the latest being the “Paris Agreement”.
Although it is deemed too weak to achieve the pledges, it marked an era of global action. Until
now, parties of the conference, i.e., member states, have been in disagreement over which states and in
what ways they are to mitigate emissions and adapt to climate change. Considering that the wealth
of states has been resting on hydrocarbon industries, the reluctance to scale down the profits these
industries create is evident in the lack of firm and legal action, let alone reductions of carbon emissions.
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The Paris agreement, as the former President of the United States, Barack Obama, noted, ‘is a turning
point’ [21], because at last many nations recognised that action needs to be taken. Many pledges have
been made, for example, to keep global temperatures “well below” 2.0 ◦C (3.6 ◦F) above pre-industrial
times and “endeavour to limit” them even more, to 1.5 ◦C; to limit the amount of greenhouse gases
emitted by human activity to the same levels that trees, soil and oceans can absorb naturally, beginning
at some point between 2050 and 2100; to review each country’s contribution to cutting emissions
every five years, so they can scale up to the challenge; and for rich countries to help poorer nations by
providing “climate finance” to adapt to climate change and switch to renewable energy [22].
However, the essential notion of the agreement—emissions targets—remains voluntary. Emissions
targets are spelled out in Intended National Determined Contributions (INDCs), which have been
disclosed [3], but they are not legally binding. In 2015, Carbon Action Tracker [23] calculated that
the pledged targets, even if achieved, would curb warming at only 2.7 degrees Celsius, not at 2.0
degrees Celsius (as promised in the agreement). As of 2018, Carbon Action Tracker writes [24] ‘little
to no progress has been detected globally on climate action either, with the total global effect of
currently implemented policies in countries expected to lead to warming of 3.3◦ C by 2100, which is
still above the Paris Agreement commitment level, the emission targets are still far too low, voluntary
and non-binding. Only a strong regulatory framework and clear signals to investors can help to curb
global warming and contribute to achieving sustainable development goals such as a reduction of
poverty and inequality, responsible consumption and production, and affordable and clean energy,
to name but a few. However, as we show in the next section, the signals from the policy makers
are mixed.
5. Carbon Liquid ‘Lock-In’ (Despite the Risks).
Oil, as Labban [25] puts it, is both a material and fictitious entity that flows underground and
seeps through the ground. It is extracted and refined, runs through car engines and many of our
everyday products [18] but is also a financialised traded stock on market exchanges. Whether oil is
at its peak, in demand or high supply, it is still traded and therefore impacts severely on the world
hydrocarbon economy. Investors will be making decisions based on oil performance as a fictitious
entity that is influenced by the society-environment-geopolitics-economy nexus. In practice, it is
manifested in an acknowledgement of big oil producers and big investors of climate change, but
without a shift in practices. BP [26] and Exxon, in their 2016 outlooks [27], stated that oil would be
in demand and that performance of these companies will remain intact. Big investment banks also
acknowledge climate change and social pressures, but as long as the oil is traded on the markets and
banks are having connections to oil, the logic of investment or disinvestment will be governed by
market forces. For example, oil prices in 2016 were at their lowest due to a slowdown in China’s
growth. Low prices are bad for oil-dependent economies—especially the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC). With low prices and low return, investors are cautious and waiting for
political movement. However, political campaigns are tied to economic performance on markets, so
who is to give a signal?
During the COP21, Bill Gates, a founder of Microsoft, a leading investor and
trend-setter/opinion-maker, created a coalition of smart investors to ‘develop effective and creative
mechanisms to analyse potential investments coming out of the research pipeline, create investment
vehicles to facilitate those investments, and expand the community of investors [28]. Meanwhile,
Warren Buffet also a leading opinion-maker, philanthropist and investor, in his position paper, wrote:
‘As a citizen, you may understandably find climate change keeping you up nights. As a
homeowner in a low-lying area, you may wish to consider moving. However, when you are thinking
only as a shareholder of a major insurer, climate change should not be on your list of worries’ [29].
Unlike coal or gas, oil has contributed to the fastest economic growth, and while coal mining is
being decommissioned, oil and its derivatives still rattle around world markets hour by hour. Since
the 1900s, when oil replaced kerosene as a source of light and was found to be useful for energy
Sustainability 2019, 11, 1695 9 of 17
production, the world has never looked the same [16]. The geography of oil was not only limited to the
young North American nation—the USA—but also to countries whose destinies changed depending
how much crude oil was left. Soon it was realised that the USA, Canada, the Middle East, Russia,
Venezuela, Nigeria, and Peru, but also stateless oceans, hold vast reserves of extractable crude oil
(hereafter conventional oil). So the fight over the rights to those reserves took place, with War World
One being one the first drastic effects.
Today, the Middle East, and in particular, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, is the largest “owner“
of (as yet) undepleted oil reserves. Due to the abundance of oil in the countries mentioned above,
economic development was built solely and exclusively on oil as an exportable (in barrels) and tradable
(on stock markets) entity. For example, the USA’s economic power was built on its oil, which reached
its peak in around the 1970s. The UK’s economic power was built on its exclusive access to Middle
Eastern oil, which was cut by rising independence among Arab nations. South American (SA) states
supplied the USA, but the contracts ceased to return benefits to SA. Each time one’s access to oil
changed, power relations shifted, and with it the price of oil and the collapse of stock markets. To
alleviate this, states whose economies rest on private oil giants (Exxon, Shell, BP) are now also seeking
alternatives in unconventional oil—tar sands, shale gas, fracking, offshore oil, and other pockets of
inaccessible oil.
Hydrocarbon economies are therefore economies that rely on conventional or unconventional oil
as a source of their income. So while there is a need to cut emissions and move to renewable energy,
there is a contradiction between two necessities: the first being for a shift away from carbon, and
the second being related to and dependent on access to a 100-year-old source of income. The most
interesting post-Paris 2015 examples of this tension are presented below.
On the 18th of December 2015, a few days after showing support for the COP21, the former
President of the United States (Barack Obama) ended 40 years of U.S. crude oil export limits by signing
off on a repeal passed by Congress [30] in exchange for a $1.1 trillion spending measure [31]. As a
result, tax breaks for renewable projects were secured, but at the same time, a repeal allowed “big
oil” to remain in operations. In other words, the USA’s global pledge and support of Climate Change
negotiations had to be re-negotiated at home, where the oil lobby remains strong. It was a trade-off
between two paradigms—environmental and carbon-economic. However, in this case, the USA’s
environmental paradigm (here tax breaks for renewables) was dictated by those who were in power
to approve spending measures under economic conditions, i.e., that crude oil export limits will end.
In March 2016, another supporter of the COP21, India’s Prime Minister, announced a new oil and
energy policy which allows for an increase in domestic production [32]. In April 2016, the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia (KSA) announced ‘it will sell off hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of American
assets held by the Kingdom if Congress passes a bill that would allow the Saudi government to be
held responsible in American courts for any role in Sept. 11, 2001, attacks” [33]. KSA also announced
to add millions of barrels of oil at any time thus causing further oversupply, and consequently further
decrease of oil prices which would not affect KSA but impact on world economy and environment as
well as roll out a comprehensive national plan for the post-oil era [34]. Lastly, in June 2017, a newly
elected president of the United States withdrew from the Paris Agreement, thus reversing the pledges
the United States previously made [35].
In Europe, similarly, trade-offs have been made. For example, having made pledges at COP21,
Europe ended decades of sanctions on Iranian oil exports in exchange for the end of Iran’s nuclear
(military) programme [36]. While the end of nuclear power programme is significant, geopolitically
speaking, it shows that oil has gained leverage in highly politicised negotiations for global and regional
(Middle East) peace. While Iran benefits from new oil exports and tensions in the region will be
stabilised, global environmental pledges were sacrificed.
In the UK, the government has also made U-turns. In April 2016, the government has backed out
from £1 million worth of funding for carbon capture storage (CCS) companies [37]. CCS is vital in
reaching climate change targets while allowing to provide energy and keeping companies in business.
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Without the investment into renewables and total disinvestment in hydrocarbons, stranded assets
will be realised sooner sending markets to disarray, thus further jeopardising a sustainable (financial
and environmental) future. In June 2016 on the other hand, the UK’s Secretary of State for Energy
and Climate Change announced a new, ambitious carbon budget (not yet made into a statutory
instrument) [24], reducing carbon emissions by 57% by 2030 with respect to 1990 levels [38]. However,
only a month later, the UK’s new Prime Minister (Mrs Theresa May, Conservative) abolished the
Department of Energy and Climate Change by merging its mandate with the Department for Business,
Energy and Industrial Strategy [39]. Environmentalists and fellow politicians highly criticised the
PM’s decision. Only two months later, and despite criticism regarding costs to the taxpayer (which
might reach up to £35 billion) and calls to opting for renewable energy [40], the UK’s PM gave the
green light to the re-development of a nuclear power plant. Hinkley Point C is planned for completion
in 2025, and it is said that it will provide 7 percent of Britain’s total electricity needs [39]. Later in
2017, the British Government announced a Clean Growth strategy for decarbonising all sectors of the
UK by focusing on investment in research and innovation, smart system plans, district heat, building
regulations, electric cars, and carbon capture storage [41].
6. The Rise of Renewables as a Necessity and Conditions for Change
We have already painted a very volatile picture; that is, political leaders supporting COP21 while
compromising their stance due to their political and economic reliance on financialised hydrocarbons.
To reverse this trend, firstly, a clear signal to investors needs to be sent, one that goes in hand with
the decision-making of investors. In other words, investors first need to be assured that renewables
are not too risky and unprofitable. A study conducted for Bloomberg’s energy finance report [42]
showed dollar investment globally growing in 2015 to nearly six times its 2004 total, and a new record
of one-third of a trillion dollars, despite influences that might have been expected to restrain it. The
study reports that ‘clean energy investment surged in China, Africa, the US, Latin America and India
in 2015, driving the world total to its highest ever figure, of $328.9 bn, up 4% from 2014′s revised $315.9
bn, and exceeding the previous record, set in 2011, by 3%’ [42].
Market analysts on the other hand warn that investing in oil might be tricky, but bets will be
continued on the rise of oil, which oil producers believe in and promise to deliver until politicians
introduce measures against it. However, as of 2016, no such measures had been introduced; rather,
the opposite was true. Governments, along with oil giants, as mentioned in the previous sections,
squeezed and explored the last drops of conventional and unconventional oil (which is not at peak,
but rather in abundance). Others, however, warn that the shale-shale boom (unconventional oil) in the
USA was founded on junk debt, similar to previous economic crises, thus warning of a new financial
catastrophe. One example that Bloomberg used is the following:
“Energy XXI owes $150 million to banks including Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc, UBS Group
AG and BNP Paribas SA, among others. S and Ridge has fully drawn its credit line with banks
including Barclays Plc, Royal Bank of Canada and Morgan Stanley, according to data compiled by
Bloomberg. The banks declined to comment.” [43].
With this in mind, we can further emphasise that COP21 might not be the only reason for stranded
assets, but rather, the nature of the increasingly volatile and financialised market itself, due to its
mechanisms and undisclosed operations, leads to a limbo, and thus to potential financial disaster.
Lloyds of London Insurance, the world’s oldest insurance market, has become the latest financial firm
to announce plans to stop investing in coal companies [44]. Other insurance firms, such as Aviva,
Allianz, Axa, Legal and General, Scor and Zurich followed suit. Unfriend Coal [45] reports that in
the past two years about £20bn has been divested. This is starting to make good business sense for
insurers, faced with hurricanes, wildfires and flooding and yawning gaps between the insurance
cost of disasters and the actual amounts insured. The gap, currently standing at over $100 billion, a
(quadrupling since the 1980s), formed a major point of discussion at the 2018 Davos meeting. Inga
Sustainability 2019, 11, 1695 11 of 17
Beale, chief executive of Lloyds, recently said: ‘It goes beyond climate change. The broader issue is
how we clean up the planet’.
Although wholesale disinvestment has not yet occurred, many investors, banks and companies are
now pledging a move toward 100% renewables and disinvestment in hydrocarbons. Some of the latest
pledges have been made by the large banks and trading firms—Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, Well Fargo
& Co [46]. Regarding energy consumption and purchasing of “cleantech”, telecommunications are
leading the way in the pledge to rely on renewables. Analysis by Bloomberg New Energy Finance [47]
indicates that $8 trillion—two-thirds of the total spent on new power generation capacity between now
and 2040—will be invested in renewable energy technologies. In May 2016, Shell—an oil producer
—also announced investments in green technology through its new division. McCallister reports
that Shell ‘with $1.7bn of capital investment currently attached to it, and annual capital expenditure
of $200m, New Energies, will be run alongside the Integrated Gas division under executive board
member Maarten Wetselaar’ [48]. Although there is a long way to go, the demand is growing in both
consumption and investment in “cleantech”.
Risks will need to be redefined and understood so that they can be accounted for. Christina
Figueres mentioned that soon investors would need new types of policies and risk managers, which
will come under scrutiny and be audited [49]. We can argue that climate regime change might come
to resemble the more sectoral changes in animal welfare. The pig, poultry and slaughtering industry
are now subject to EU animal welfare directives and regulations, and are audited and accounted for.
Retailers, here, could be compared to investors (as they purchase from producers), and further demand
and audit these industries. Consumers end up purchasing the products they demanded. Animal
producers are then forced to comply if they wish to stay in market operation. Poorer performing
producers, due to low animal welfare performance, are “weeded out”. The shift to higher animal
welfare requires a change in producers’ culture and attitude, but EU- and state-driven legislation can
enable and prompt this shift to occur. However, the realisation that higher animal welfare means
staying in business and on top of the game equally helps, too. State intervention, then, in carbon-
and especially oil-based economies could be central for guiding and re-enforcing shifts to post-carbon
economies in energy/agri-food.
This takes us to the final point, which concerns a willingness to think beyond short-term
financialised returns, short-termism in business, and siding with ‘business as usual’ practices, which
are indeed less and less predictable. Financial cycles have shorter spans than environmental cycles.
Short-termism goes against long-term goals, but what is crucial is also the culture of quick returns. It
is perhaps a choice of whether to persist with a business that is characterised by ‘mature provinces
in decline and fiercely contested, prices volatile, ingenuity strained, exploration pushed to the ends
of the earth at spiralling cost and risk, and unforeseen competitors are inexorably taking away
demand’ [50]. The question is ‘should hydrocarbon companies ignore, deny, resist, diversify, hedge,
finance, transform, or decline?’ To which he answers, ‘That strategic choice is stark, tough, and
increasingly urgent’ [50]. In other words, business-as-usual and short-termism will cease to give a
return on investment.
Scholars working in stranded assets have argued that financial behaviours and tools need to
be adjusted [51], while the UNEP Inquiry [52] calls for a sustainable financial world, which is an
important starting point and worth studying further. The question that needs to be asked is whether
investing in and consuming clean technology would be enough to bring a better future for the world,
or whether the financial world itself would also have to be changed so that the cleantech investment
stays clean. Considering the points raised in this paper, we support the findings of stranded assets
teams that suggest that without a change in the financial world [52] and a reconceptualization of the
role of oil, the sustainable progress might also be equally stranded. Changes in financial investment
behaviours thus need to accompany the directional changes now being witnessed in post-carbon
technologies. With this in mind, we propose a reconceptualization of the issue at stake in line with
Marsden’s [1,8] four pillars of sustainability.
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7. Conclusions: Exploring the Fragmented and Contested Energy/Agri-Food Nexus
It is now generally recognised that in the energy sector, at least, a major and profound
transformation is taking place towards renewable sources despite the conventional ‘lock in’ tendencies
also outlined in this paper. Jacobson and Delucchi [53,54] have suggested that it is now technically
possible to generate almost all of the world’s current (12.5 Terawatts) energy needs and deal with the
future growing demands (17TW) by 2030. If this transition continues—and it is our conclusion, despite
countervailing tendencies, that it will—it is likely to create the needs and conditions for both radical
re-investment in centralised new production and distribution systems, concentrated solar power plants
(such as those now being developed in China), geothermal plants, solar photovoltaic plants, tidal
turbines and other wind and wave devices. A key question, following McCarthy [10], becomes the
degree to which these tendencies lead to further concentrated or distributed systems of production
and provision (as outlined in Figure 2).
We should recognise that renewable energy sources and production practices—not unlike
food production—are typically more distributed, both in their energy capture and in their material
production than fossil fuel and nuclear sources. In terms of capturing and using renewable energy,
it is spread over more space and time, and does not necessarily lend itself to agglomeration or
concentrated systems of delivery. In short, it requires a different scalar and geographical ‘fix’, and
thus also provides significant opportunities for more distributed and decentralised systems to be
developed, especially on or alongside rural and agricultural, and of course marine, resources (see
Figure 2 for examples). As a result, not unparalleled in pre-industrialised peasant agricultures and
practices, the very natural capture and fixing of renewable energy and multifunctional agricultures
gives opportunities for place-based communities and small businesses to enter and build new markets
and production systems.
In Germany, for instance [55], by 2013, and because of the national Energiewende policy of
developing renewable and phasing our nuclear and carbon energy sources, nearly half of the new
installed capacity for renewables is already operated by civil society at local and community levels. As
Kropp [55] argues ‘renewable energies entail a significant re-composition of the socio-eco-technical
links between landscapes, energy and society, accompanied by fierce debates on energy policy’.
Major questions and opportunities thus surround how the opportunities for municipalities and
civil society organisations (especially energy cooperatives) can compete with, or indeed develop
alongside, the more capital-intensive and centralised infrastructures and renewable energy companies.
Marx indeed noted that, as Kropp [55] quotes: ‘the hand mill gives you society with the feudal
lord, the steam-mill society with the industrial capitalist [56]. One might therefore now ask what
types of new oligarchies or panarchies the renewable revolution will encourage? McCarthy [10] tends
to suggest [3], that these transformations will provide just another timely ‘spatial fix’ for the next
phase of neo-liberalised and crisis-ridden capitalism, and that the current write-downs in carbon-based
investments are indeed the most recent manifestations of the crisis and contradictory nature of historical
capitalist development. For these scholars, then, the spectre of the energy and agri-food transition can
leave industrial and financial capitalism largely intact, but now without its reliance upon its traditional
carbonised resources and markets. A sort of post-carbonised corporate capitalism built upon new
concentrated technologies and spatialities of capture, enclosure and production.
We argue here (see Figure 1; Figure 2) that both the contested energy and the attendant
agri-food transformations which are now ongoing will also provide opportunities for a wider vector
of (post-capitalist) eco-economic development; some of which will create the conditions for more
distributed and indeed socially and spatially emancipating development. The very material nature of
both renewable energy and agri-food production now relies at least partly upon distributed sourcing
over space, time and nature (not least, air, water and soils). It thus requires harnessing the bio-sphere
in new ways, and it places rural land and producers with new local and community opportunities.
With potentially more capital moving into these post-carbon fields (quite literally), as Ritchie and
Dowlatabadi [57] go on to conclude:
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‘The (divestment) movement is not about purely financial logic—it does, in our view, have
the potential to change social norms around the perceived acceptability of where financial capital
is located and the impacts associated with its returns. This could produce signals that change the
wider institutional landscape for investing in a low-carbon future. Divestment can establish a broader
dialogue on investing in sustainable energy, and a holistic view of energy transition, while urging
financial portfolios to reflect this. Reducing demand for fossil fuel energy and re-organising production
processes in many sectors will require forward-looking investments, not just changing our mode of
energy production. Reducing liquid fuel demand in transportation will be of prime importance. The
development of energy-efficient housing and sustainable food will also be needed.’
Our nexus approach developed here necessarily leads to questions as to how the agri-food sector
will emerge and develop within the context of these post-carbon energy transitions. We can expect
an increasing (but uneven) demand upon rural land-as we indeed witnessed with the first wave
of bio-fuels (2007-8), for use for renewable energy sources. The role of a reflexive and facilitative
multi-level state, as Kropp [55] identifies in Bavaria, will be critical in both stimulating and shaping
these transitions to what she calls a ‘third modernity’.
Similarly, agricultural production itself will need to become far-less ‘carbonised’ and centralised.
This can act as a stimulus for the growth of agro-ecological and organic food production and revised
‘nested markets’, which provide increasing supplies of quality foods to urban consumers. This is
already leading to more re-localised food supply chains and assemblages in many parts of the world.
There is then a spectre of a co-evolutionary transformation of both energy and agri-food as part-
and-parcel of the contested post carbon-transition. This will of course be highly uneven both over time
and space, and create its own particular uneven geographies. In addition, not least will competitively
co-evolve with more centralised, oligopolistic and corporate trajectories, which we also begin to outline
here. As we have documented here, the nexus transformations we are thus now witnessing, we need
to recognise, are not leading to the total demise or indeed passivity of industrial or financial capitalism.
However, they are both set to radically transform its former reliance upon extractive and emitting
technologies and practices, as well as potentially ‘shrink’ its spatial and level of corporate control. This,
follows the logic developed by scholars such as Harvey [58] and Moore [59], that it is not realistic to
assume constant annual growth rates (of approximately 3%) in capitalist economies any longer, as new
frontiers of traditional resource-intensive appropriation are dwindling due to both resource depletion
and indeed political and civic society opposition, not least by the growing divestment movements.
Thus, in this new political-ecological context, at the very least, environmental scholars and activists
need to be exploring the potentialities for post-capitalist and certainly post-neo-liberal models of nexus
development—such as community share schemes, agri-food solidarity and translocal movements,
agro-ecological cooperatives, and shorter and more equitable profit-sharing schemes. These include
and embody radically different spatialities, which are far removed from the spatial fix and lock-in
tendencies of the past (see Figures 1 and 2). We are only at the foothills of understanding these new
nexus spatialities; and still less in articulating them such that both state authorities can see them and as
well as civil society stakeholders. The current ecological crisis (climate change and resource depletion)
has coincided with a strong bout of crisis ridden capitalist neo-liberalism. The rise of post carbonism
does not need necessarily to follow the same pathway.
This is the opportunity that the timely but uncertain confluence of both the ‘shrinkage’ of
carbonised capitalism, on the one hand, and the rise of the post-carbon transition on the other
brings to the energy/agri-food nexus. It also necessitates a re-politicisation of natural resource
governance- a renewed and engaged political ecology—in ways that re-connect civil society and
local communities to the active and collective re-definition of their access, material production
and use of natural and renewable assets. This provides an urgent research agenda framing the
intermediaries and contestations between carbonised and post-carbon strategies with regard to
unfolding the agri-food/energy nexus. Most importantly, the research agenda should consider the
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territorial (human and animal) and very much day-to-day inequalities, risks and uncertainties resulting
from the battles within the agri-food-energy nexus.
Author Contributions: The manuscript was prepared, written and researched by both authors.
Funding: This research received no external funding.
Acknowledgments: The authors would like to thank the Sustainable Places Institute for the financial and its staff
members for administrative support. Many thanks for invaluable comments from the anonymous reviewers.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors certify that they have NO affiliations with or involvement in any organization
or entity with any financial interest (such as honoraria; educational grants; participation in speakers’ bureaus;
membership, employment, consultancies, stock ownership, or other equity interest; and expert testimony or
patent-licensing arrangements), or non-financial interest (such as personal or professional relationships, affiliations,
knowledge or beliefs) in the subject matter or materials discussed in this manuscript.
References
1. Marsden, T. Agri-food and Rural Development: Sustainable Place-making; Bloomsbury Publishing: London, UK;
New York, NY, USA, 2017.
2. Bank of England. Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon—Climate Change and Financial Stability—Speech by
Mark Carney. Bank of England. 2015. Available online: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/
files/speech/2015/breaking-the-tragedy-of-the-horizon-climate-change-and-financial-stability.pdf?la=
en&hash=7C67E785651862457D99511147C7424FF5EA0C1A (accessed on 2 March 2019).
3. UNFCCC Secretariat. Welcome to the Interim NDC Registry. 2019. Available online: https://www4.unfccc.
int/sites/ndcstaging/Pages/Home.aspx (accessed on 2 March 2019).
4. Ben Caldecott. Why Stranded Assets Matter and Should Not Be Dismissed. The Conversation. 2015.
Available online: https://theconversation.com/why-stranded-assets-matter-and-should-not-be-dismissed-
51939 (accessed on 2 March 2019).
5. Caldecott, B.; Howarth, N.; McSharry, P.; Stranded Assets in Agriculture: Protecting Value from
Environment-Related Risks. Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment, Oxford University. 2013.
Available online: https://www.smithschool.ox.ac.uk/publications/reports/stranded-assets-agriculture-
report-final.pdf (accessed on 2 March 2019).
6. Caldecott, B.; Robbins, N.; Greening China’s Financial Markets: The Risks and Opportunities of
Stranded Assets. Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment. Oxford University, 2014. Available
online: https://www.smithschool.ox.ac.uk/research/sustainable-finance/publications/Greening-Chinas-
Financial-Markets.pdf (accessed on 2 March 2019).
7. Butler, N. Climate Change and the Myth of Stranded Assets. Financial Times. 2015. Available online:
https://www.ft.com/content/509f7358-357b-3a10-8f24-98c669a15cf6.
8. Thompson, J.; Millstone, E.; Scoones, I.; Ely, A.; Marshall, F.; Shah, E.; Stagl, S. Agri-Food System Dynamics:
Pathways to Sustainability in an Era of Uncertainty; STEPS Working Paper 4; STEPS Centre: Brighton, UK, 2007.
9. Marsden, T. Exploring the Rural Eco-Economy: Beyond Neoliberalism. Sociol. Rural. 2016, 56, 597–615.
[CrossRef]
10. McCarthy, J. A socioecological fix to capitalist crisis and climate change? The possibilities and limits of
renewable energy. Environ. Plan. A 2015, 47, 2485–2502. [CrossRef]
11. Bridge, G. Resource Geographies 11: The resource-state nexus. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 2014, 38, 118–130.
[CrossRef]
12. Calvert, K. From Energy geography to energy geogrprahies: Persepctives on a fertile academic borderland.
Prog. Hum. Geogr. 2014, 10, 6463.
13. Frantal, B.; Martinat, S. New Rural Spaces: Towards Renewable Energies, Multifunctional Farming, and Sustainable
Tourism; UGN: Brno, Czech Republic, 2013.
14. Moragues Faus, A.; Marsden, T. The political ecology of food: Carving ‘spaces of possibility’ in a new
research agenda. J. Rural Stud. 2017, 55, 275–288. [CrossRef]
15. Moragues Faus, A.; Sonnino, R.; Marsden, T.K. Exploring European food system vulnerabilities: Towards
integrated food security governance. Environ. Sci. Policy 2017, 75, 184–215. [CrossRef]
Sustainability 2019, 11, 1695 15 of 17
16. Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, UK. Farm Business Income by Type of Farm in
England, 2016/17. National Statistics, UK, 2017. Available online: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/752593/fbs-businessincome-statsnotice-
26oct17.pdf (accessed on 2 March 2019).
17. National Farmers Union. Farmer Confidence Rises for 2017, NFU Survey Shows. National Farmers Union, 2016.
Available online: https://www.nfuonline.com/cross-sector/farm-business/economic-intelligence/economic-
intelligence-news/farmer-confidence-rises-for-2017-nfu-survey-shows/ (accessed on 2 March 2019).
18. Yeomans, M. Oil: Anatomy of an Industry; New Press: New York, NY, USA, 2004.
19. United Nations. Paris Agreement. United Nations, 2015. Available online: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/
files/english_paris_agreement.pdf (accessed on 2 March 2019).
20. Rowe, M.; Meat Industry Must Lobby to Protect Interests after Paris Climate Change Deal. William Reed.
2015. Available online: http://www.globalmeatnews.com/Environment/Meat-industry-must-lobby-to-
protect-interests-after-Paris-climate-change-deal (accessed on 2 March 2019).
21. Obama, B.; Remarks by President Obama at the First Session of COP21. The White House. 2015. Available
online: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/30/remarks-president-obama-
first-session-cop21 (accessed on 2 March 2019).
22. Briggs, H.; What Is in the Paris Climate Agreement. BBC. 2 March 2019. Available online: https://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/science-environment-35073297 (accessed on 2 March 2019).
23. Climate Action Tracker. 2.7 ◦C Is Not Enough—We Can Get Lower. Climate Action Tracker, 2015.
Available online: https://climateactiontracker.org/documents/44/CAT_2015-12-08_2.7degCNotEnough_
CATUpdate.pdf (accessed on 2 March 2019).
24. Climate Action Tracker. Some Progress Since Paris, but Not Enough, as Governments Amble Towards 3 ◦C
of Warming. Climate Action Tracker. 2018. Available online: https://climateactiontracker.org/documents/
507/CAT_2018-12-11_Briefing_WarmingProjectionsGlobalUpdate_Dec2018.pdf (accessed on 2 March 2019).
25. Labban, M. Oil in parallax: Scarcity, markets, and the financialization of accumulation. Geoforum 2010, 41,
541–552. [CrossRef]
26. British Petroleum (BP). BP Energy Outlook 2016 Edition. Outlook to 2035. 2016. Available online:
https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/
energy-outlook/bp-energy-outlook-2016.pdf (accessed on 2 March 2019).
27. Exxon Mobil. The Outlook for Energy: A View to 2040. Exxon Mobil, 2016. Available online: https://cdn.
exxonmobil.com/~{}/media/global/files/outlook-for-energy/2016/2016-outlook-for-energy.pdf (accessed
on 2 March 2019).
28. The Breakthrough Energy Coalition. Reliable, Affordable Energy for the World Investing in a Carbonless
Future. The Breakthrough Energy Coalition, 2019. Available online: http://www.b-t.energy/ (accessed on
2 March 2019).
29. Roston, E. Paris Climate Pact: Too Little, too Late? Bloomberg News, 2016. Available online: https://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-19/paris-climate-pact-too-little-too-late(accessed on 2 March 2019).
30. Wingfield, B.U.S. Reverses Decades of Oil-Export Limits with Obama’s Backing. Bloomberg News, 2015.
Available online: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-18/house-votes-to-repeal-u-s-oil-
export-limits-senate-vote-next(accessed on 2 March 2019).
31. House, B.; Wasson, E.; Congress Passes U.S. Spending Bill to End Oil Export Ban. Bloomberg News,
2 March 2019. Available online: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-18/house-passes-u-
s-spending-bill-that-ends-crude-oil-export-ban(accessed on 2 March 2019).
32. Adjecent Oil and Gas. India Reveals New Oil and Gas Policy. Adjecent Oil and Gas, 2016.
Available online: http://www.adjacentoilandgas.co.uk/exploration-production/india-reveals-new-oil-
and-gas-policy/23189/ (accessed on 2 March 2019).
33. Mazzetti, M.; Saudi Arabia Warns of Economic Fallout If Congress Passes 9/11 Bill. The New York Times.
2016. Available online: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/16/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-warns-
ofeconomic-fallout-if-congress-passes-9-11-bill.html?_r=(accessed on 2 March 2019).
34. Hamade, R.; Shahine, A. Saudi Arabia’s Post-Oil Plan Starts April 25, Prince Says. Bloomberg News, 2, 25
April 2016. Available online: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-16/saudi-arabia-to-
launch-plan-for-the-future-april-25-prince-says(accessed on 2 March 2019).
Sustainability 2019, 11, 1695 16 of 17
35. Rose, G.; Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord. The White House. 2017. Available
online: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-
accord/ (accessed on 2 March 2019).
36. Blas, J. Iran Oil Lands in Europe for First Time Since Sanctions End. Bloomberg News, 2016. Available
online: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-06/iranian-oil-lands-in-europe-for-first-time-
since-sanctions-ended(accessed on 2 March 2019).
37. Adjecent Oil and Gas. Where Next for CCS? Adjecent Oil and Gas, 2016. Available online: http://
www.adjacentoilandgas.co.uk/health-safety-environment/where-next-for-ccs/22858/ (accessed on 2 March
2019).
38. UK Government. Carbon Budgets. UK Government. 2016. Available online: https://www.gov.uk/
guidance/carbon-budgets (accessed on 2 March 2019).
39. Vaughan, A.; Abolition of Decc ‘Major Setback for UK’s Climate Change Efforts’. The Guardian. 2016.
Available online: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/jul/15/decc-abolition-major-setback-
for-uk-climate-change-efforts (accessed on 2 March 2019).
40. National Audit Office, UK. Nuclear Power in the UK. National Audit Office. 2016. Available online: https:
//www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Nuclear-power-in-the-UK.pdf (accessed on 2 March
2019).
41. HM Government, UK. The Clean Growth Strategy Leading the Way to a Low Carbon Future. HM
Government, UK. Available online: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/700496/clean-growth-strategy-correction-april-2018.pdf (accessed
on 2 March 2019).
42. Bloomberg NEF. Clean Energy Defies Fossil Fuel Price Crash to Attract Record $329bn Global Investment in
2015. Bloomberg NEF, 2016. Available online: https://about.bnef.com/blog/clean-energy-defies-fossil-fuel-
price-crash-to-attract-record-329bn-global-investment-in-2015/ (accessed on 2 March 2019).
43. Loder, A.; Griffin, D.; Klein, J.X. Biggest Wave Yet of U.S. Oil Defaults Looms as Bust Intensifies. Bloomberg
News, 2016. Available online: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-25/biggest-wave-yet-
of-u-s-oil-defaults-looms-as-bust-intensifies(accessed on 2 March 2019).
44. Kollewe, J.; Lloyd’s of London to Divest from Coal Over Climate Change. The Guardian. 2018. Available
online: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/jan/21/lloyds-of-london-to-divest-from-coal-over-
climate-change (accessed on 2 March 2019).
45. Unfriend Coal. Report: Leading Insurance Companies Divest $20b from Coal and End Underwriting.
Unfriend Coal, 2017. Available online: https://unfriendcoal.com/leading-insurance-companies-divest-20b-
from-coal-and-end-underwriting/ (accessed on 2 March 2019).
46. Loh, T.; JPMorgan Won’t Back New Coal Mines to Combat Climate Change. Bloomberg News. 2016.
Available online: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-07/jpmorgan-won-t-finance-new-
coal-mines-that-worsen-climate-change (accessed on 2 March 2019).
47. The Climate Group. RE100. Growing Market Demand for Renewable Power. RE100 Annual Report 2016.
The Climate Group, 2016. Available online: https://www.theclimategroup.org/sites/default/files/2016_
annual_report.pdf (accessed on 2 March 2019).
48. McCallister, T.; Shell Creates Green Energy Division to Invest in wind power. The Guardian. 2016. Available
online: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/may/15/shell-creates-green-energy-division-to-
invest-in-wind-power (accessed on 2 March 2019).
49. Pensions and Lifestyle Savings Association. The Climate Challenge. Plenary 9 at PLSA Investment
Conference 2016. 2016. Available online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jdwk- (accessed on 2 March
2019).
50. Lovins, A.B. As Oil Prices Gyrate, Underlying Trends Are Shifting to Oil’s Disadvantage, Forbes. 2016.
Available online: https://www.forbes.com/sites/amorylovins/2016/01/20/oil-markets-and-security/
#1b7920bd58db (accessed on 2 March 2019).
51. Kruitwagen, L.; MacDonald-Korth, D.; Caldecott, B.; Summary of Proceedings Environment-Related
Risks and the Future of Prudential Regulation and Financial Conduct 4th Stranded Assets Forum,
Waddesdon Manor, 23 October 2015. Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment, Oxford University.
2015. Available online: https://www.smithschool.ox.ac.uk/research/sustainable-finance/publications/
StrandedAssetsForum-October2015-Summary-of-Proceedings.pdf (accessed on 2 March 2019).
Sustainability 2019, 11, 1695 17 of 17
52. United Nations. Environment. Inquiry into the Design of a Sustainable Financial System. United Nations.
2 March 2019. Available online: http://web.unep.org/inquiry/ (accessed on 2 March 2019).
53. Jacobson, M.Z.; Delucchi, M.A. A path to sustainable energy by 2030. Sci. Am. 2009, 301, 58. [CrossRef]
[PubMed]
54. Jacobson, M.Z.; Delucchi, M.A. Providing all global energy with wind, water, and solar power, Part I:
Technologies, energy resources, quantities and areas of infrastructure, and materials. Energy Policy 2011, 39,
1154–1169. [CrossRef]
55. Kropp, C. Controversies around energy landscapes in third modernity. Landsc. Res. 2018, 43, 562–573.
[CrossRef]
56. Marx, K. Capital. Critique of Political Economy; Verlag von Otto Meisner: Hamburg, Germany, 2009.
57. Ritchie, J.; Dowlatabadi, H. Fossil Fuel Divestment: Reviewing Arguments, Implications and Policy Opportunities;
Pacific Institute of Climate Solutions: Knowledge, Insight, Action; University of British Columbia: Vancouver,
BC, Canada, 2015.
58. Harvey, D. The geography of capitalist accumulation. In Spaces of Capital; Harvey, D., Ed.; Routledge: New
York, NY, USA, 2001; pp. 237–266.
59. Moore, J. Transcending the metabolic rift: A theory of crisis in capitalist world ecology. J. Peasant Stud. 2011,
38, 1–46. [CrossRef]
© 2019 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution
(CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
